Depleted Uranium
ANAWA supports the International Coalition to Ban Uranium Weapons – to find out more about depleted uranium visit http://www.bandepleteduranium.org
What are Depleted Uranium Weapons
Depleted Uranium itself is a chemically toxic and radioactive compound, which is used in armour piercing munitions because of its very high density. It is 1.7 times denser than lead, giving DU weapons increased range and penetrative power. They belong to a class of weapons called kinetic energy penetrators. The part of the weapon that is made of DU is called a penetrator: this is a long dart weighing more than four kilograms in the largest examples: it is neither a tip nor a coating. The penetrator is usually an alloy of DU and a small amount of another metal such as titanium and molybdenum. These give it extra strength and resistance to corrosion.
In addition to armour-piercing penetrators, DU is used as armour in US M1A1 and M1A2 battle tanks and in small amounts in some types of landmines (M86 PDM and ADAM), both types contain 0.101g of DU in the resin cases of the individual mines. 432 ADAM antipersonnel landmine howitzer shells were used on the Kuwaiti battlefields during the 1991 Gulf War. Both M86 PDM and ADAM mines remain in U.S. stockpiles. Patents exist for the use of a ‘dense metal’ as ballast in large ‘bunker busting’ bombs; such weapons have been deployed but it is unclear whether they contain DU, tungsten or a third high density substance, as their contents remain classified.
Where has DU been used and when
Governments have often initially denied using DU because of public health concerns. It is now clear that DU was used on a large scale by the US and the UK in the Gulf War in 1991, then in Bosnia, Serbia and Kosovo, and again in the war in Iraq by the US and the UK in 2003. It is suspected that the US also used DU in Afghanistan in 2001, although both the US and UK governments have denied using it there. However, leaked transport documents suggest that US forces in Afghanistan have DU weapons. The continued use of A10 ‘Warthog’ aircraft in support of NATO ground troops indicates that DU may be being used there.
2010 ICBUW Discussion Paper (excerpt)
Although there have been no long-term full-scale studies into civilian health in areas where uranium weapons have been used, the results of laboratory research, the patterns of illness in veterans and reports of cancers and birth malformations strongly suggest that there is a strong potential for harm.
History shows that when uranium weapons are used, it is enormously difficult to undertake detailed field research into their potential impact. Population movements, the weakness of post-conflict health and political administration and a lack of financial and technical assistance will always hinder work in post-conflict environments.
A wide range of factors may affect the risk from uranium weapon contamination; these include climate, soil types, land use and proximity to human habitation. However, perhaps the most significant factor is technical expertise. The swift identification, safe management and long-term monitoring of sites require a high level of expertise, and expensive specialist equipment, which for a variety of reasons is usually lacking in states affected by conflict. Financial support and political will also play a crucial role but cannot be guaranteed to be readily available.
Unsurprisingly the presence of uranium weapon contamination also affects the social and economic health of communities where they are used. Fear of radiation may be magnified by distrust of national and international authorities and can cripple economic redevelopment. In other cases, pressure on land use may result in unsafe contaminated sites returning to use for agriculture, housing or industry.
There are no quick fixes or technological modifications that could reduce the potential risk from uranium weapons. They will always contain uranium, which will always be chemically and radiologically toxic.
To read more of this report ICBUW 2010 Discussion Paper